Page 4 - InterPilot 2019 Issue 3

PRESIDENT’S EDITORIAL
IFALPA Editorial
Captain Jack Netskar, President
B737 Max Summit, Montreal, Canada
In March 2019, regulators and airlines around the
world grounded the B737 MAX passenger aircraft
after two nearly new aircraft tragically crashed less
than five months apart, killing all 346 passengers
and crew. The accidents befell Lion Air Flight 610
on October 29, 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight
302 on March 10, 2019.
Ethiopian Airlines was first to ground the aircraft,
effective the day of the accident. On March 11, the
aircraft’s airworthiness was publicly reaffirmed by
its certifying agency, the US Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration. The same day, the CAA of China was
the first regulator to order the MAX grounding.
In the next two days, most other airlines and reg-
ulators around the world grounded it as well. On
March 13, the FAA was one of the last agencies
to ground the MAX, citing similarities between the
two crashes. In total, 387 airplanes were grounded.
From the time the B737 MAX was grounded un-
til today, countless news articles, television/radio
broadcasts, PRs, aviation expert commentary and
so-called experts have been produced. Informa-
tion has been provided about the relationship be-
tween regulators and the manufacturer regarding
withholding important information about the air-
craft type, about the cost pressures that challenge
flight safety as priority number 1, about problem-
atic issues concerning internal reporting, etc.
For IFALPA, it is important to maintain credibility in
our statements and positions as safety profession-
als. We must, therefore, seek information from the
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primary source, and, at the same time, keep track
of what our Member Associations and the com-
munity at large bring forward.
As part of this information gathering, IFALPA has,
among other things, met with representatives of
Boeing for three separate briefings. Most recently,
we attended the IATA B737 MAX 2nd Summit in
Montreal, just last week.
The purpose of this exceptional meeting, attended
by 18 airlines, 9 regulators, Boeing, ICAO, IFALPA,
CAE, lessors, and other relevant stakeholders, was
to identify the challenges and gain a common un-
derstanding of a roadmap to bring the B737 MAX
back to operation in the safest, most efficient, and
timely manner possible.
The big question amongst all stakeholders, includ-
ing IFALPA, is the “return to service” process. Views
on this will vary depending on who you talk to, but
for us the priorities are clear:
1. The technical challenges must be remedied
and satisfy established safety standards;
2. The regulatory processes must take place in a
way that prevents a greater degree of self-reg-
ulation and removal of factors for different un-
derstanding of the systems;
3. The training must be adequate and relevant
information about the flight systems must be
available.
The absence of one or more of these points will
result in a lack of trust, and that is precisely where
Editorial
we have been, and still partially remain. It was
therefore fruitful that the three main contributions
came from Boeing, the FAA, and CAE. “In a world
Point 1 is technically being solved by Boeing and of growing
approved by the FAA. MCAS is one component of
the Speed Trim System (STS). The technical fix is competitions, we
based on new software/Flight control law in the
737 MAX flight control computer. This will provide
similar flaps-up protection to the already existing need to improve
flaps-down 737NG STS. IFALPA is confident that
all parts of the system are being reviewed and se- and increase the
cured. Boeing as a company cannot withstand an-
other accident. amount of training
a professional
Point 2 has been a concern at IFALPA for a long
time. We have a long-standing cooperation with
OEMs through, among others, the ADO Commit- pilot receives, not
tee, but we have no formal lines to Certifying state
and therefore have less insight into the processes diminish it. The
surrounding certifying types. This process takes
place between the individual state CAA and OEM. gradual erosion of
IFALPA and our MAs are related to the CAAs more
on the oversight part. This means that we must rely training time will
on Certifying state and aircraft manufacturers to
do a qualitatively good job and ensure that assess-
ments are based on flight safety and not selling have a delayed
points. Are we creating software fixes to be able
to sell an aircraft as one type to reduce required effect as the older
training? It is an important question to ask. generation of pilots
The FAA is focused on providing Safe and Compli- leave the left seat
ant Aircraft Design and changes to MCAS design
on one hand and the return-to-service process on and take their
the other. EASA, TC, and ANAC have a commit-
ment to collaborative process with the FAA for cer-
tification, pilot training, and ungrounding. Given experience with
the reduced degree of trust that exists for both the
manufacturer and the regulator, it will be crucial them.”
that all these regulators, as well as China, reach an
agreement before the aircraft is put into service. IFALPA PILOT TRAINING
STANDARDS MANUAL
It would be very problematic politically to argue
that the aircraft is safe when someone does not
approve parts of the changes and does not return
it to service. What is important to understand is
that only the FAA certifies Boeing, while all other
regulators validate this process.
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